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Who Votes for Islamist Parties –  
and Why?
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner
When parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia in late October 2014, the Islamist 
Ennahda party, which had won most of the votes in 2011, was defeated. This shows 
that if Islamist parties make no concrete improvements, the people who voted for them 
will punish them.
Analysis
Voters for Islamist parties are often described as poor and easily manipulated, people 
who trade their votes for the social services provided by Islamist charitable organiza-
tions. However, surveys reveal that support for Islamist parties is not primarily about 
patronage. Even in countries where Islamists supply social services for many people, 
their voters are not less educated or more often unemployed than voters for “more sec-
ular” parties. The fact that Islamist voters agree with central issues of Islamist party 
programmes suggests that these parties partly use content, rather than offers of selec-
tive material incentives, to mobilize voters.
  Whether a party wins more for clientelistic reasons or more because of its pro-
gramme influences how accountable it will be to voters. 
  Data from opinion polls show that Islamist voters’ values tend to coincide with 
Islamist party policies, for example, conservative attitudes regarding social issues 
such as gender equality, the acceptance of homosexuality and the condemnation of 
corruption.
  Despite the upheavals of the “Arab Spring”, in many countries Islamist parties have 
no particular influence on political decisions. Opinion polls conducted between 
2011 and 2013 revealed that it was the group of Islamist party voters who consid-
ered politics and democracy to be most important. The authoritarian consolidation 
that is taking place in most Arab countries could, however, cause these voters to be-
come alienated from institutional politics or even become radicalized.
Key words: Arab Spring, Islamist parties, voters, clientelism
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How Islamist Voters are Typically Represented 
Tunisia’s second democratic election following 
the overthrow of authoritarian President Zine El-
Abidine Ben Ali was held in late October 2014. 
The Islamist Ennahda party, which had won the 
2011 elections for the constituent assembly with 
37 per cent of the seats (the next-strongest party 
got only nine per cent), came in second in 2014. 
Ennahda lost a good third of its votes and 20 seats 
in Parliament. 
This voter migration shows that Islamist vot-
ers – at least in Tunisia – do not blindly support 
Islamist parties, and do expect concrete econom-
ic and social changes. Should these fail to be re-
alized, Islamist voters hold their parties account-
able and withdraw their support. It is not surpris-
ing that political parties are made to pay for the 
lack of improvements in elections; however, Is-
lamist parties have been regarded as a special cat-
egory because of their religious ideology. 
Until recently, little attention was given to the 
social profile and expectations of Islamist vot-
ers. Electoral research focused on elites, while re-
search on political Islam concentrated on Islamist 
ideology. The paramount question was wheth-
er political Islam is compatible with Western de-
mocracy; this was answered by combining Koran 
exegesis with studies of Islamist propaganda. The 
reasons why Islamist parties are elected – aside 
from allusions to the failure of Arab states to pro-
vide their populations with public goods or to the 
Islamists’ presenting a credible opposition to the 
current rulers – remained underexposed by re-
search.
The most important question with regard to 
the profiles of Islamist party voters, however, is 
whether they vote more because of clientelism or 
because of the content of the party programme. 
This determines voters’ expectations and thus 
how they will hold parties accountable. Research-
ers have two conflicting opinions about Islamist 
party supporters – which lead to very different 
evaluations of the long-term success of Islamist 
parties in (democratic) elections.
One viewpoint, which is widespread in the 
media, characterizes Islamist voters as easily ma-
nipulated, relatively poor, little-educated mem-
bers of the population who have clientelistic re-
lationships with Islamist organizations. The ba-
sic assumption of this view is that the social ser-
vices provided by Islamist organizations – hos-
pitals, educational institutions, charitable work 
and jobs – are paid for in votes (Toth 2003; Full-
er 2003). Islamist parties are not expected to im-
plement a particular policy because they are not 
held accountable for fulfilling election promises 
but rather for supplying social services. Islamist 
governments get carte blanche for their policies 
and the achievements of their terms in office – as 
long as they maintain the social services.
Another view holds that Islamist party voters 
belong mostly to the middle class, and that re-
cruitment for supporters is not conducted verti-
cally, as in clientelistic relationships, but rather 
horizontally (Clark 2004). Islamists are believed 
to seek voters amongst the population segments 
that resemble themselves socioeconomically. 
Studies have documented the high level of ed-
ucation of many Islamist party cadres and pol-
iticians: El-Said and Rauch (forthcoming) for 
the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, and Pellic-
er and Wegner (2015) for the Justice and Devel-
opment Party in Morocco, where Islamist party 
supporters mostly belong to the educated class-
es who see their social mobility blocked by rul-
ing elites. Such groups particularly suffer be-
cause of corruption, whose eradication is often 
one of the main campaign issues of Islamist par-
ties. In addition to their usual socially conser-
vative demands, Islamist party voters want the 
fight against corruption and nepotism to be giv-
en priority. 
The Social Profile of Islamist Voters
In recent years, various studies have examined 
the social profiles of Islamist voters. This incipi-
ent electoral research makes use of voter data and 
a growing number of opinion polls. One type of 
study of Islamist voters analyses social profiles, 
paying special attention to educational levels and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The key concept 
is that poorer and uneducated voters have been 
proven more susceptible to clientelism than those 
who are economically better off and more educat-
ed: Poor voters’ high degree of approval for a par-
ty could thus indicate that it is clientelistic. An-
other approach examines the social and political 
values of Islamist voters, asking how much they 
dovetail with party electoral programmes and 
what distinguishes Islamist party voters from 
voters for other parties.
- 3 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  1/2015
Thus far, studies of voters’ profiles have focused 
on election data, evaluating the socioeconomic 
profiles of electoral districts where Islamist par-
ties are particularly successful. This approach 
yields different results in different countries. In 
their study of the Egyptian parliamentary elec-
tions of 2011 and 2012, Elsayyad and Hanafi 
(2014) conclude that there is a negative link be-
tween educational levels and votes for Islamists, 
that is, approval for Islamists is higher in elector-
al districts of largely uneducated people. The au-
thors explain this finding through the indoctri-
nation that is assumed to take place in mosques. 
However, studies in Morocco and Tunisia that 
use the same methods arrive at the opposite re-
sult: they find a positive correlation between ed-
ucational levels and votes for Islamists (Pellicer 
and Wegner 2014 for the elections in Morocco in 
2002 and 2007; Gana, Hamme and Rebah 2012 for 
the 2011 elections in Tunisia). Thus, a profile of 
clientelistic voters is indicated in Egypt, but not 
in Morocco and Tunisia.
However, these studies are based on data 
about electoral districts, not on individual voting 
behaviour. In other words, the findings are based 
on the average features of an electoral district, 
without any knowledge about which part of the 
population actually voted for the Islamists. Es-
pecially in cases of low voter turnout, which of-
ten occurs in these countries, it is possible that, to 
give just one example, in electoral districts with 
generally low educational levels, it is mostly the 
educated voters who vote – thereby distorting 
the results. The bigger the electoral district, the 
more likely the distortions. The Egyptian study is 
based on just 48, thoroughly heterogeneous, elec-
toral districts. 
Islamist Voters: Higher Educational Levels and 
Greater Interest in Politics
The World Values Survey has been conducting 
representative national opinion polls on attitudes 
and values in almost 100 countries, including Ar-
ab countries such as Morocco and Egypt from 
2001. Tunisia and Yemen were added to the last 
“wave” that was published in 2014. These sur-
veys identify respondents’ socioeconomic back-
grounds as well as their preferred political par-
ties. These two voter attributes make it possible 
to check the plausibility of both theories about the 
profile of Islamist party voters. The theory on cli-
entelism expects these voters to have lower ed-
ucational levels and be less interested in politics 
than other groups of voters, while the “middle-
class theory” assumes that Islamist party voters 
will have higher educational levels and be more 
interested in politics.
Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents 
with higher school-leaving qualifications, as 
well as the percentages of respondents who ex-
press serious interest in politics, for three differ-
ent groups:
1) Islamist party voters,
2) Voters for other parties and
3) Non-voters, who make up the largest group in 
most countries.
The data illustrate that in terms of the relation-
ship between educational level and support for 
Islamist parties, there are two groups of coun-
tries: In the first group of Algeria, Yemen and Mo-
rocco, Islamist party voters have higher educa-
tional levels than the other voter groups. The big-
gest gap is between Islamists and non-voters in 
Morocco, where almost a third of Islamist party 
Table 1: Voter Behaviour, Educational Level and Degree of Political Interest
Islamist  
Voters
Voters of 
Other Parties
Non-Voters Islamist  
Voters
Voters of 
Other Parties
Non-Voters
Secondary Education High Political Interest
Morocco 29 24   9 56 45 13
Algeria 47 35 42 36 36 24
Tunesia 24 24 42 59 50 30
Egypt 32 30 24 74 71 17
Jordan 41 39 38 66 63 43
Palestine 55 56 - 71 58 -
Yemen 34 20 23 72 49 41
Total 37 33 26 61 54 27
Source: World Values Survey, data in percentages (authors’ calculation).
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supporters and only nine per cent of the non-vot-
ers have higher school-leaving qualifications.
In contrast, in the second group of countries that 
includes Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia, 
there is no significant difference in educational 
levels amongst the various voter groups, although 
Islamist voters tend to have slightly higher educa-
tional levels than the other groups.
In all of these countries, however, Islamist vot-
ers indicate their very serious interest in politics. 
For most countries, this is very clear, particularly 
in comparison with non-voters. However, there is 
also a distinct difference when Islamist party vot-
ers are compared with voters for other parties.
These data contradict the image of the poor, 
easily manipulated voters for Islamist parties: In 
some countries, Islamist voters are not very dif-
ferent from voters for other parties. Where differ-
ences exist between Islamist party voters and oth-
ers, the former have higher educational levels and 
are more interested in politics. As a whole, the big-
gest difference regarding educational levels and 
interest in politics is found between voters and 
non-voters.
This conclusion could be countered by ar-
guing that clientelistic voters are only found in 
countries where Islamist parties have large char-
ity organizations, like those found in Egypt, Jor-
dan and Palestine. Where Islamists have less to 
distribute, for example, in Morocco and Algeria, 
it should be more difficult to mobilize large seg-
ments of the poor. The data in Table 1 does in-
deed show that as a whole, in countries with big 
Islamist social networks, there are fewer differ-
ences between Islamist voters and voters for oth-
er parties than in countries with smaller Islamist 
organizations.
On that score, Figure 1 presents a more differ-
entiated analysis of Islamist voter profiles. The 
countries are divided into two groups, based on 
the scale of their Islamist charities. The group with 
relatively small charities (blue dots) includes the 
Maghreb countries and Yemen. The second group 
includes Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, where Is-
lamist parties often have very close links to, or 
even function as, large charities (red dots).1 This 
figure shows Islamist voters’ interest in politics, 
their school-leaving qualifications, employment 
status and age in relation to voters for other par-
ties (left) and non-voters (right). The values for 
non-Islamist voter groups are found along the 
vertical zero line and values for Islamist party 
voters, along the horizontal.2 The farther the dots 
for the Islamist parties are found from the zero 
line, the greater the differences are to the other 
groups of voters.
In countries with smaller Islamist charities, Is-
lamist voters have higher educational levels and 
are less often unemployed. In these countries, 
they are not at the fringes of society but rather, 
are socially well integrated. In contrast, in coun-
1 Countries and survey effects are taken into account so that 
differences between individual surveys or, e.g., a country 
that has a lot of Islamist voters, will not bias the results.
2 The dots show the estimates and the lines, the confidence 
intervals. In other words: Where horizontal lines cross the 
zero line, voter characteristics cannot be clearly distinguished.
Figure 1: Islamist Charities and Voting Behaviour
Source: World Values Survey (authors’ calculations).
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tries with large Islamist networks it is clear that 
Islamists do not differ demographically from vot-
ers for other parties. A more striking disparity is 
the Islamist voters’ greater interest in politics, a 
characteristic they share with Islamist voters in 
other countries, indicating that Islamist party vot-
ers tend to be more interested in politics than oth-
er groups of voters. 
The finding in Figure 1 is unambiguous: Even 
in countries in which Islamist parties are closely 
connected with very developed charities, like the 
Islamic Action Front’s association with the Islam-
ic Center Charity Society in Jordan, Islamist vot-
ers do not belong to the poorer segments of the 
population. In these countries, their social back-
ground strongly resembles that of voters of oth-
er parties, and they are more likely to be better off 
than non-voters. 
Islamist Voters’ Values
We have seen that people who vote for Islamist 
parties are generally well integrated in their so-
cieties. But if social differences are not the an-
swer, what is it that distinguishes Islamist par-
ty voters? For a long time, researchers drew con-
clusions about these voters by comparing Is-
lamist thought and the practises of Islamist par-
ties, movements and organizations with ideal-
ized Western expectations. Many studies were 
conducted about exactly how moderate Islamists 
could be, that is, how much liberal-democratic 
thought they include in their discourse and pro-
grammes (Schwedler 2006; Schwedler 2011; Wick-
ham 2004). Likewise, attitudes towards women 
or the percentage of women in Islamist parties – 
often in comparison with European countries – 
were measured.
Recent research has adopted other methods 
and explanatory approaches, contextualizing 
party positions and practises as well as voter at-
titudes in Middle Eastern and North African so-
cieties. This is of crucial significance since these 
generally very conservative groups will always 
appear “negative” when compared with Western 
ideals. In the representative opinion polls of the 
World Values Survey in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Palestine and Yemen, for exam-
ple, 80 per cent of respondents believe that men 
are more suited to be political leaders than wom-
en; only six per cent believe that divorce can be 
justified; and fewer than one per cent approve of 
homosexuality.
An unpublished study on election behaviour 
in the Middle East and North Africa by Cavator-
ta and Wegner (2014) also uses survey data (the 
World Values Survey and the Afrobarometer) to 
compare the values of Islamist party voters with 
those of average voters and voters for secular par-
ties. The study reveals that after eliminating fac-
tors such as education, sex and age, voters for Is-
lamist parties are more conservative than oth-
er groups with regards to divorce and women’s 
emancipation. In connection with the findings 
about the social background of Islamist voters, it 
can be said that this group of voters consists of 
relatively well-educated, well-integrated mem-
bers of society, who tend to have more conserva-
tive values than others. The study’s authors inter-
pret this as evidence of “programmatic” voting 
– that Islamist party voters are not mobilized by 
clientelistic promises, but rather with party plat-
forms that reflect their values.
Another study about Islamist voters’ atti-
tudes, based on data from the Arab Barometer, 
reaches similar conclusions (Robbins 2010). The 
study emphasizes two additional factors: First, 
frustration about corruption in countries such as 
Palestine, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria is closely 
correlated with support for Islamist parties. Sec-
ond, voters for Islamist parties consider that their 
(non-Islamist) governments perform very bad-
ly. These factors are consistent with the middle-
class profile of Islamist voters described above, 
and underscore that Islamist party voters, too, 
expect concrete improvements from Islamists in 
government and base their support on tangible 
results.
The Future of Islamist Voters
As a whole, support for Islamist parties is not 
clientelistic. On the contrary, even in countries 
where Islamists provide social services for many 
people, voters for Islamist parties are not less edu-
cated than voters for “more secular” parties.  Fur-
thermore, these voters support the main points in 
Islamist party platforms that include conservative 
social values and the need to fight corruption.
Islamist voters have little political influ-
ence following the authoritarian backlashes that 
took place in some “Arab Spring” countries. 
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The change in direction was particularly radi-
cal in Egypt, where the military coup of 2013 led 
to mass imprisonments, mass trials and a large 
number of death sentences for members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was declared a ter-
rorist group and banned. But even in Morocco, 
the Islamist Party for Justice and Development 
(PJD) is, at best, only formally in charge of the 
government: The king still runs the show, and ev-
er more legislation is being drafted to reduce po-
litical transparency.3
In this context, the question arises about the 
future direction of Islamist voters. Surveys made 
between 2011 and 2013 described them as the 
group who considered that politics and democ-
racy were most important. That could change, 
perhaps increasing these voters’ alienation from 
institutional politics, further swelling the large 
ranks of non-voters or pushing them towards a 
radicalism that would swell the ranks of extrem-
ists.
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